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Abstract— We derive a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of
the compound wiretap channel with channel state information at
the transmitter which matches the general upper bound on the
secrecy capacity of general compound wiretap channels given by
Liang et al. and thus establishing a full coding theorem in this
case. We achieve this with a quite strong secrecy criterion and
with a decoder that is robust against the effect of randomisation
in the encoding. This relieves us from the need of decoding the
randomisation parameter which is in general not possible within
this model. Moreover we prove a lower bound and a multi-letter
converse to the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel
without channel state information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compound wiretap channels are among the simplest non-
trivial models incorporating the requirement of security against
a potential eavesdropper while at the same time the legitimate
users suffer from channel uncertainty. They may be considered
therefore as a starting point for theoretical investigation tend-
ing towards applications, for example, in wireless systems, a
fact explaining an alive research activity in this area in recent
years (cf. [1], [2] and references therein).
In this paper we consider finite families of pairs of channels
W = {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, . . . , T }1 with common input alphabet
and possibly different output alphabets. The legitimate users
control Wt and the eavesdropper observes the output of Vt.
We will be dealing with two communication scenarios. In the
first one only the transmitter is informed about the index t
(channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter) while in
the second the legitimate users have no information about that
index at all (no CSI). This setup is a generalisation of Wyner’s
[3] wiretap channel.
Our contributions are summarised as follows: In [1] a general
upper bound on the capacity of compound wiretap channel
as the minimum secrecy capacity of the involved wiretap
channels was given. We prove in Section III-B that the models
whose secrecy capacity matches this upper bound contain all
compound wiretap channels with CSI at the transmitter. At
the same time we achieve this bound with a substantially
stronger security criterion called strong secrecy which has
been employed already in [4], [5], [6], and [7]. Indeed, our
security proof follows closely that developed in [7] for single
wiretap channel with classical input and quantum output. In
order to achieve secrecy we follow the common approach
according to which randomised encoding is a permissible
1Along the way we will comment what our results look like when applied to
widely used class of models of the form W = {(Wt, Vs) : t = 1, . . . , T, s =
1, . . . , S} with T 6= S which are special case of the model we are dealing
with in this paper
operation. The impact of randomisation at the legitimate
decoder’s site is usually compensated by communicating to
her/him the outcome of the random experiment performed.
However , in the case of compound wiretap channel with CSI
at the transmitter this strategy does not work as is illustrated
by an example in Section III-B. We resolve this difficulty by
developing a decoding strategy which is independent of the
particular channel realisation and is insensitive to randomisa-
tion while decoding just at the optimal secrecy rate for all
channels {Wt : t = 1, . . . , T } simultaneously.
Moreover, a slight modification of our proofs allows us to
derive a lower bound on the capacity of the compound wiretap
channel without CSI. Additionally, we give a multi-letter
converse to the coding theorem. This is content of Section
III-C. Due to space limitation we cannot provide proofs here
and refer to the online supporting material [8].
Our results are easily extended to arbitrary sets (even un-
countable) of wiretap channels via standard approximation
techniques [9].
II. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL
Let A,B,C be finite sets and θ = {1, . . . , T } an index
set. We consider two families of channels Wt : A→ P(B)2,
Vt : A → P(C), t ∈ θ, which we collectively abbreviate by
W and call the compound wiretap channel generated by the
given families of channels. Here the first family represents the
communication link to the legitimate receiver while the output
of the latter is under control of the eavesdropper. In the rest
of the paper expressions like W⊗nt or V ⊗nt stand for the n-th
memoryless extension of the stochastic matrices Wt, Vt.
An (n, Jn) code for the compound wiretap channel W consists
of a stochastic encoder E : Jn → P(An) (a stochastic matrix)
with a message set Jn := {1, . . . , Jn} and a collection of
mutually disjoint decoding sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ Jn}. The
maximum error probability of a (n, Jn) code Cn is given by
e(Cn) := max
t∈θ
max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)W⊗nt (Dcj |xn). (1)
I.e. neither the sender nor the receiver have CSI.
If CSI is available at the transmitter the probability of error
in (1) changes to
eCSI(Cn) := max
t∈θ
max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)W⊗nt (Dcj |xn). (2)
Notice, however, that the decoder appearing in (2) has to be
universal, i.e. independent of the channel index t in accordance
2P(B) denotes the set of probability distributions on B
to the fact that no CSI is available at the receiver.
We assume throughout the paper that the eavesdropper always
knows which channel is in use.
Definition 2.1: A non-negative number R is an achievable
secrecy rate for W with or without CSI respectively if there
is a sequence (Cn)n∈N of (n, Jn) codes such that
lim
n→∞
eCSI(Cn) = 0 resp. lim
n→∞
e(Cn) = 0,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R and lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) = 0, (3)
where J is a uniformly distributed random variable taking
values in Jn and Znt are the resulting random variables at the
output of eavesdropper’s channel V ⊗nt .
The secrecy capacity in either scenario is given by the
largest achievable secrecy rate and is denoted by CS(W) and
CS,CSI(W).
Remark. A weaker and widely used security criterion is
obtained if we replace (3) by limn→∞maxt∈θ 1nI(J ;Znt ) = 0.
We prefer to follow [4], [6], and [7] and require the validity of
(3). A nice discussion of several secrecy criteria is contained
in [2].
III. CAPACITY RESULTS
A. Preliminaries
In what follows we use the notation as well as some
properties of typical and conditionally typical sequences from
[10]. For p ∈ P(A), W : A→ P(B), xn ∈ An, and δ > 0 we
denote by T np,δ the set of typical sequences and by T nW,δ(xn)
the set of conditionally typical sequences given xn.
The basic properties of these sets that are needed in the sequel
are summarised in the following three lemmata.
Lemma 3.1: Fixing δ > 0, for every p ∈ P(A) and W :
A→ P(B) we have
p⊗n(T np,δ) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A|2−ncδ
2 (4)
W⊗n(T nW,δ(xn)|xn) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A||B|2−ncδ
2 (5)
for all xn ∈ An with c = 1/(2 ln 2). In particular, there is
n0 ∈ N such that for each δ > 0 and n > n0
p⊗n(T np,δ) ≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2 (6)
W⊗n(T nW,δ(xn)|xn) ≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2 (7)
holds with c′ = c2 .
Proof: Standard Bernstein-Sanov trick using the proper-
ties of types from [10] and Pinsker’s inequality. The details
can be found in [11] and references therein for example.
Recall that for p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B) pW ∈ P(B)
denotes the output distribution generated by p and W and that
xn ∈ T np,δ and yn ∈ T nW,δ(xn) imply that yn ∈ T npW,2|A|δ .
Lemma 3.2: Let xn ∈ T np,δ , then for V : A→ P(C)
|T npV,2|A|δ| ≤ α−1 (8)
V n(zn|xn) ≤ β for all zn ∈ T nV,δ(xn) (9)
hold where
α = 2−n(H(pV )+f1(δ)) (10)
β = 2−n(H(V |p)−f2(δ)) (11)
with universal f1(δ), f2(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→∞ f1(δ) =
0 = limδ→∞ f2(δ).
Proof: Cf. [10].
In addition we need a further lemma which will be used
to determine the rates at which reliable transmission to the
legitimate receiver is possible.
Lemma 3.3: Let p, p˜ ∈ P(A) and two stochastic matrices
W, W˜ : A → P(B) be given. Further let q, q˜ ∈ P(B) be the
output distributions, the former generated by p and W and the
latter by p˜ and W˜ . Fix δ ∈ (0, 14|A||B|). Then for every n ∈ N
q⊗n(T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2−n(I(p˜,W˜ )−f(δ)) (12)
for all x˜n ∈ T np˜,δ and
q⊗n(T nW,δ(xn)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2−n(I(p,W )−f(δ)) (13)
for all xn ∈ T np,δ holds for a universal f(δ) > 0 and
limδ→0 f(δ) = 0.
Proof: Cf. [11].
The last lemma is a standard result from large deviation theory.
Lemma 3.4: (Chernoff bounds) Let Z1, . . . , ZL be i.i.d.
random variables with values in [0, 1] and expectation EZi =
µ, and 0 < ǫ < 12 . Then it follows that
Pr
{
1
L
L∑
i=1
Zi /∈ [(1 ± ǫ)µ]
}
≤ 2 exp
(
−L · ǫ
2µ
3
)
,
where [(1± ǫ)µ] denotes the interval [(1− ǫ)µ, (1 + ǫ)µ].
B. CSI at the transmitter
The main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5: The secrecy capacity of the compound wire-
tap channel W with CSI at the transmitter is given by
CS,CSI(W) = min
t∈θ
max
V→X→(Y Z)t
(I(V, Yt)− I(V, Zt)). (14)
Notice first that the inequality
CS,CSI(W) ≤ min
t∈θ
max
V→X→(Y Z)t
(I(V, Yt)− I(V, Zt))
is trivially true since we cannot exceed the secrecy capacity
of the worst wiretap channel in the family W. This has been
already pointed out in [1]. The rest of this section is devoted
to the proof of the achievability. Proof: We choose
p1, . . . , pT ∈ P(A) and define new distributions on An by
p′t(x
n) :=
{
p
⊗n
t (x
n)
p
⊗n
t (T
n
pt,δ
)
if xn ∈ T npt,δ,
0 otherwise
. (15)
Define then for zn ∈ Cn
Q˜t,xn(z
n) := V nt (z
n|xn) · 1T n
Vt,δ
(xn)(z
n) (16)
on Cn. Additionally, we set for zn ∈ Cn
Θ′t(z
n) =
∑
xn∈T n
pt,δ
p′t(x
n)Q˜t,xn(z
n). (17)
Now let S := {zn ∈ Cn : Θ′t(zn) ≥ ǫαt} where ǫ = 2−nc
′δ2
(cf. Lemma 3.1) and αt is from (10) in Lemma 3.2 computed
with respect to pt and Vt. By lemma 3.2 the support of Θ′t
has cardinality ≤ α−1t since for each xn ∈ T npt,δ it holds thatT nVt,δ(xn) ⊂ T nptVt,2|A|δ, which implies that
∑
zn∈S Θt(z
n) ≥
1− 2ǫ, if
Θt(z
n) = Θ′t(z
n) · 1S(zn) and
Qt,xn(z
n) = Q˜t,xn(z
n) · 1S(zn). (18)
Now for each t ∈ θ define Jn ·Ln,t i.i.d. random variables X(t)jl
with j ∈ [Jn] := {1, . . . , Jn} and l ∈ [Ln,t] := {1, . . . , Ln,t}
each of them distributed according to p′t with
Jn =
⌊
2n[mint∈θ(I(pt,Wt)−I(pt,Vt))−τ ]
⌋
(19)
Ln,t =
⌊
2n[I(pt,Vt)+
τ
4 ]
⌋
(20)
for τ > 0. Moreover we suppose that the random matrices
{X(t)j,l }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,l] and {X(t
′)
j,l }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,l] are independent
for t 6= t′. Now it is obvious from (17) and the definition of
the set S that for any zn ∈ S Θt(zn) = EtQt,X(t)
jl
(zn) ≥ ǫαt
if Et is the expectation value with respect to the distribution
p′t. For the random variables β−1t Qt,X(t)
jl
(zn) (βt from (11))
define the event
ιj(t) =
⋂
zn∈Cn
 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
Q
t,X
(t)
jl
(zn) ∈ [(1± ǫ)Θt(zn)]
 ,
(21)
and keeping in mind that Θt(zn) ≥ ǫαt for all zn ∈ S. It
follows that for all j ∈ [Jn] and for all t ∈ θ
Pr{(ιj(t))c} ≤ 2|C|n exp
(
− Ln,t 2
−n[I(pt,Vt)+g(δ)]
3
)
(22)
by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.2, and our choice ǫ = 2−nc′δ2 with
g(δ) := f1(δ) + f2(δ) + 3c
′δ2. Making δ > 0 sufficiently
small we have for all sufficiently large n ∈ N and all t ∈ θ
Ln,t2
−n[I(pt,Vt)+g(δ)] ≥ 2n τ8 . Thus, for this choice of δ the
RHS of (22) is double exponential in n uniformly in t ∈ θ
and can be made smaller than ǫJ−1n for all j ∈ [Jn] and all
sufficiently large n ∈ N. I.e.
Pr{(ιj(t))c} ≤ ǫJ−1n ∀t ∈ θ. (23)
Let us turn now to the coding part of the problem. Let p′t ∈
P(An) be given as in (15). We abbreviate X := {X(t)}t∈θ
for the family of random matrices X(t) = {X(t)jl }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t]
whose components are i.i.d. according to p′t. We will show now
how the reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [Jn] can be
achieved when randomising over the index l ∈ Ln,t without
any attempt to decode the latter at the legitimate receiver’s
site. To this end let us define for each j ∈ [Jn] a random set
D′j(X ) :=
⋃
s∈θ
⋃
k∈[Ln,s]
T nWs,δ(X
(s)
jk ), (24)
and the subordinate random decoder {Dj(X )}j∈[Jn] ⊆ Bn is
given by
Dj(X ) := D′j(X ) ∩
( ⋃
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
D′j′ (X )
)c
. (25)
Consequently we can define the random average probabilities
of error for a specific channel t ∈ θ by
λ(t)n (X ) :=
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ).
(26)
Now (25) implies for each t ∈ θ and l ∈ [Ln,t]
W⊗nt ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl )
≤W⊗nt (
⋂
s∈θ
⋂
k∈[Ln,s]
(T nWs,δ(X
(s)
jk ))
c|X(t)jl )
+
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,s]
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl )
≤W⊗nt ((T ⊗nWt,δ(X
(t)
jl ))
c|X(t)jl )
+
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,s]
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl ).
(27)
By Lemma 3.1 and the independence of all involved random
variables we obtain
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ))
≤ (n+ 1)|A||B| · 2−ncδ2
+
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,s]
E
X
(s)
j′k
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl ).
(28)
We shall find now for j′ 6= j an upper bound on
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl )
=
∑
xn∈An
p′t(x
n)W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|xn)
≤
∑
xn∈An
p⊗nt (x
n)
p⊗nt (T npt,δ)
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|xn)
=
q⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k))
p⊗nt (T npt,δ)
.
(29)
By Lemma 3.1 and by Lemma 3.3 for any t, s ∈ θ we have
p⊗nt (T npt,δ) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ
2
q⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B| · 2−n(I(ps,Ws)−f(δ))
(30)
with a universal f(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→0 f(δ) = 0 since
X
(s)
j′,k ∈ T nps,δ with probability 1. Thus inserting this into (29)
we obtain
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl )
≤ (n+ 1)
|A||B|
1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 · 2
−n(I(ps,Ws)−f(δ))
(31)
for all s, t ∈ θ, all j′ 6= j, and all l ∈ [Ln,t], k ∈ [Ln,s].
Now by defining νn(δ) := (n+1)|A||B| ·2−ncδ2 and µn(δ) :=
1 − (n + 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 thus for each t ∈ θ, l ∈ [Ln,t], and
j ∈ [Jn] (28) and (29) lead to
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))
c|X
(t)
jl ))
≤ νn(δ) +
(n+ 1)|A||B|
µn(δ)
Jn
∑
s∈θ
Ln,s2
−n(I(ps,Ws)−f(δ))
≤ νn(δ)
+
(n+ 1)|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · Jn · 2
−n(mins∈θ(I(ps,Ws)−I(ps,Vs))−f(δ)−
τ
4
)
≤ νn(δ) +
(n+ 1)|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · 2−n(τ−f(δ)−
τ
4
)
≤ νn(δ) +
(n+ 1)|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · 2−n
τ
2
(32)
where we have used (20), (19), and we have chosen δ > 0
small enough to ensure that τ − f(δ) − τ4 ≥ τ2 . Defining
a = a(δ, τ) :=
min{cδ2, τ4 }
2 we can find n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) ∈ N
such that for all n ≥ n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|)
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl )) ≤ T · 2−na (33)
holds for all t ∈ θ, l ∈ [Ln,t], and j ∈ [Jn]. Consequently, for
any t ∈ θ we obtain
EX (λ
(t)
n (X )) ≤ T · 2−na. (34)
We define for any t ∈ θ an event ι0(t) = {λ(t)n (X ) ≤√
T2−n
a
2 }. Then using the Markov inequality and (34) yields
Pr{(ι0(t))c} ≤
√
T2−n
a
2 . (35)
Set ι :=
⋂
t∈θ
⋂Jn
j=0 ιj(t). Then with (23), (35), and applying
the union bound we obtain
Pr{ιc} ≤
∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=0
Pr{(ιj(t))c} ≤ T ǫ+ T 32 2−na2 ≤ T 2 · 2−nc
′′
for a suitable positive constant c′′ > 0 and all sufficiently large
n ∈ N.
Hence, we have shown that for each t ∈ θ there exist
realisations {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι of X .
We show that the secrecy level is fulfilled uniformly in t ∈ θ
for any particular {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι Denoting
by || · || the variational distance we have
∥∥∥ 1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
V nt (·|x(t)jl )−Θt(·)
∥∥∥
≤ 1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
∥∥∥V nt (·|x(t)jl )− Q˜t,x(t)
jl
(·)
∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥ 1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
(
Q˜
t,x
(t)
jl
(·)−Q
t,x
(t)
jl
(·))∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥ 1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
Q
t,x
(t)
jl
(·)−Θt(·)
∥∥∥ ≤ 5ǫ, (36)
In the first term the functions V nt (·|x(t)jl ) and Q˜t,x(t)
jl
(·) differ
if zn /∈ T nVt,δ(x
(t)
jl ), so it makes a contribution of ǫ to
the bound. In the second term Q˜t and Qt are different for
zn /∈ S and because ιj(t) and
∑
zn∈S Θt(z
n) ≥ 1− 2ǫ imply
1
Ln,t
∑Ln,t
l=1
∑
zn∈S Qt,x(t)
jl
(zn) ≥ 1 − 3ǫ, the second term is
bounded by 3ǫ. The third term is bounded by ǫ which follows
directly from (21).
For any {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι with the correspond-
ing decoding sets {Dj : j ∈ [Jn]} it follows by construction
that
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤
√
T · 2−na′ (37)
is fulfilled for all t ∈ θ with a′ > 0, which means that we have
found a (n, Jn) code with average error probability tending to
zero for n ∈ N sufficiently large for any channel realisation.
Now by a standard expurgation scheme we show that this still
holds for the maximum error probability. We define the set
Gt := {j ∈ Jn : 1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤
√
η} (38)
with η :=
√
T ·2−na′ and denote its complement as Bt := Gct
and the union of all complements as B =
⋃
t∈θ Bt. Then (37)
and (38) imply that
η ≥ 1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≥
|Bt|
Jn
√
η (39)
for all t ∈ θ and by the union bound it follows that |B| ≤ T ·√
η·Jn . After removing all j ∈ B (which are at most a fraction
of T 54 2−na
′
2 of Jn) and relabeling we obtain a new (n, J˜n)
code (Ej .Dj)j∈[J˜n] without changing the rate. The maximum
error probability of the new code fulfills for sufficiently large
n ∈ N
max
t∈θ
max
j∈[J˜n]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤ T
1
4 · 2−na
′
2 . (40)
On the other hand, if we set Vˆ nt (zn|(j, l)) := V nt (zn|x(t)jl )
and further define Vˆ nt,j(zn) = 1Ln,t
∑Ln,t
l=1 Vˆ
n
t (z
n|(j, l)),
V¯ nt (z
n) = 1
J˜n
∑J˜n
j=1 Vˆ
n
t,j(z
n), we obtain that
‖Vˆ nt,j − V¯ nt ‖ ≤ ‖Vˆ nt,j −Θt‖+ ‖Θt − V¯ nt ‖ ≤ 10ǫ, (41)
for all j ∈ [J˜ ]n, t ∈ θ with ǫ = 2−nc′δ2 where we have
used the convexity of the variational distance and (36) which
still applies by our expurgation procedure. For a uniformly
distributed random variable J ∈ [J˜n], we obtain with Lemma
2.7 of [10] (uniform continuity of the entropy function)
I(J ;Znt ) =
J˜n∑
j=1
1
J˜n
(H(V¯ nt )−H(Vˆ nt,j)) (42)
≤ −10ǫ log(10ǫ) + 10nǫ log |C| (43)
uniformly in t ∈ θ (for 10ǫ ≤ e−1). Hence the strong
secrecy level of the definition 2.1 holds uniformly in
t ∈ θ. Using standard arguments (cf. [10] page 409)
we then have shown the achievability of the secrecy rate
mint∈θ maxV→X→(Y Z)t(I(V, Yt)− I(V, Zt)).
Now with a simple example we will show that indeed identi-
fying both the message and the randomizing indices at the
legitimate receiver is not possible for all pairs j ∈ [Jn]
and l ∈ [Ln,t]. This is in contrast to the case where we
have only one channel to both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper (cf. [7], [4]). Therefore let η ∈ [0, 1] and
set Dη :=
(
1− η η
η 1− η
)
. Further, define the channels to
the legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper by W0 =
Dη, η ∈ [0, 12 ), V0 := DτW0, τ ∈ [0, 12 ), τ ≈ 0, and
W1 := DτˆV0 = DτˆDτW0, V1 :=
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
. Let W :=
{(Wt, Vt) : t = 0, 1}. Hence V0 and W1 are degraded
versions of W0 and I(p, V1) = 0, for all p ∈ P(A). Now
for every p ∈ P(A) we can choose τ small enough, such that
I(p,W0) − I(p, V0) < I(p,W1). With p0 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, ν > 0
we have in the case of CSI at the transmitter by the defining
equations (19) and (20) Jn = 2n[I(p0,W0)−I(p0,V0))−ν] and
Ln,0 = 2
n[I(p0,V0)+
ν
4 ]
. But choosing τˆ ∈ (0, 1/2] large enough
we obtain 1/n log(JnLn,0) = I(p0,W0)− 3ν4 > I(p0,W1) =
CCSI{W0,W1}, for all small ν > 0. Here, CCSI{W0,W1}
stands for the capacity of the compound channel without
secrecy, with CSI at the transmitter.
Remark. Note that for W := {Wt, Vs : t = 1, . . . T, s =
1, . . . S} with S 6= T and the pair (s, t) known to the
transmitter prior to transmission nothing new happens. A slight
modification of the arguments presented above shows that
CC,CSI(W) = min
(t,s)
max
V→X→(YtZs)
(I(V, Yt)− I(V, Zs)).
C. No CSI
In this final section we describe briefly the capacity results
in the case where neither the transmitter nor the receiver have
access to the channel state. We omit the proofs which can
be found in the online supporting material [8]. Achievability
part, for example, is shown by a simple modification of the
proof presented in Section III-B. Nevertheless it should be
mentioned that the traditional method of proof, i.e. sending
messages and the randomisation parameters to the legitimate
receiver, works as well in the present model.
Theorem 3.6: For any compound wiretap channel W we
have
CS(W) ≥ max
U→X→YtZt
(min
t∈θ
I(U, Yt)−max
t∈θ
I(U,Zt)),
where X and YtZt are connected via (Wt, Vt). Consequently,
by simple blocking argument we obtain
CS(W) ≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→X→Y nt Z
n
t
(min
t∈θ
I(U, Y nt )−max
t∈θ
I(U,Znt )).
Moreover,
CS(W) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→X→Y nt Z
n
t
(min
t∈θ
I(U, Y nt )−max
t∈θ
I(U,Znt )).
Let us consider now the case W := {Wt, Vs : t = 1, . . . T, s =
1, . . . S} with S 6= T and the pair (s, t) unknown to both
the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. If we additionally
assume that each Vs is a degraded version of every Wt then the
upper bound in Theorem 2 of [12] together with the concavity
of I(X ;Yt|Zs) in the input distribution, which holds in the
degraded case, imply that
CS(W) = max
p∈P(A)
(min
t
I(p,Wt)−max
s
I(p, Vs)).
a result which was obtained in [1] with a weaker notion of
secrecy.
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